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STATUTES_AND_E_LES 
Utah Rules or A p p e l l a t e Procedure , Rule 35 1 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintitf-Respondent< 
vs. 
RICHARD LYNN WRIGHT, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 20746 
Priority 2 
RESPONDENT'S ANSWER TO 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
This Court issued its unanimous decision in defendant-
appellants case on June 9, 1987. Defendant-appellant has 
petitioned for a rehearing of the case, pursuant to Rule 35, Utah 
Rules ot Appellate Procedure. This Court has invited the State 
of Utah to file an answer to the petition for rehearing. This 
answer is filed in response to that invitation. 
£XA2Eg£&X_QE_XB£-£A££ 
State of Utah adopts the Statement of the Case from its 
amended briet on appeal. 
£XAI£M£BX_QE_XHE_£ft£I£ 
The State ot Utah adopts the Statement of Facts from 
its amended brief on appeal and all facts contained in the 
Argument portion ot said brief with the following 
supplementation: 
When this case was orally argued to this Court on March 
13, 1986, counsel for appellant, for the first time on appeal, 
submitted copies of a complaint which apparently had been filed 
in Ogden City Court (Complaint No* 6-471-472F) on September 8, 
1976, charging Richard Lynn Wright with two counts of aggravated 
kidnapping. However, the complaint indicates that it was amended 
on September 13, 1976, deleting Richard Lynn Wright's name, and 
substituting the name of Leonard Eugene Wright. The complaint 
also contains the notations, "DEFENDANT STATES TRUE NAME IS 
LEONARD EUGENE WRIGHT." This complaint is attached as Appendix 
A. Also, at oral argument, counsel for appellant submitted a 
minute entry from Ogden City Court (Case No. 27295) which 
indicates that on September 13, 1976, the complaint was indeed 
amended to charge Leonard Euguene Wright with aggravated 
kidnapping, and that on September 24, 1976 (the day set for 
Leonard Wright's preliminary hearing) , the Deputy Weber County 
Attorney dismissed the complaint altogether. This minute entry 
is attached as Appendix B. Finally, at oral argument, counsel 
for appellant also submitted a newspaper article which stated 
tnat two counts of aggravated kidnapping had been filed "late 
Wednesday" against Richard Lynn Wright who was still at large. 
This article is attached as Appendix C. 
During oral argument, counsel for appellant conceded 
that these documents previously had not been made part of the 
record on appeal, but noted that the 1976 complaint had been 
alluded to at hearing in district court on the defendant's motion 
to dismiss the charges. The transcript of that hearing T2 at 
298-99 reads as follows: 
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BERNARD ALLEN (Defense Counsel): Counsel for 
the State has also said that because actual 
charges are not filed against the defendant 
that tnat lets them off the hook in terms of 
the speed [sic] trial in this case. 
Well, there are two issues tnere. One, 
were charges actually filed? Yes, they were 
actually filed. Yes, the charge against 
Leonard Eugene Wright was apparently filed 
for the purpose of being against the 
defendant here. 
You can see if you look at the — Where's 
the charge, Counsel? You can see by looking 
at that, the original State's report, the 
original file was reported in the name 
Richard Lynn Wright, which is the individual 
they knew to be the one they were looking 
for. At some point in time they had taken 
white and whited it out, and said that, "Now 
we're looking for Leonard Eugene Wright, when 
I have the identification of an individual 
named Leonard Eugene Wright." 
To use tnat and say, "Well, but we've 
never filed against this individual is a 
ludicrous argument, your Honor. 
Later, during the lower court proceedings, defense counsel 
stated: 
BERNARD ALLEN: Finally, the prosecutor, Mr. 
Daroczi, is trying to state that no compliant 
was filed against the defendant. Well, 
that's pure nonsense. 
In every police report we have here and in 
the copy of the newspaper article, two counts 
ot aggravated kidnapping were filed against a 
California man. Complaints were issued late 
Wednesday. This is later on the same date. 
The complaints were issued against Richard 
Lynn Wright, the defendant who is sitting 
here currently. 
T2 at 330-31. 
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EQ1H2LI 
THIS COURT NEITHER OVERLOOKED NOR 
MISAPPREHENDED ANY POINTS OF FACT OR LAW IN 
REACHING ITS DECISION TO REJECT DEFENDANT'S 
SPEEDY TRIAL CLAIM. 
Rule 35, Utah Rules ot Appellate Procedure, limits 
Petitions for Rehearing to points where the Court purportedly 
overlooked or misapprehended facts or law in reaching its 
decision. Decisions under former rehearing Rule 76(e) reflect 
additional principles for rehearing applications. The rehearing 
should not be utilized to challenge areas of the decision which 
appellant merely disagrees with or considers unsatisfactory. Nor 
should it be used to reargue grounds originally presented. 
£UDUDiQgS-X.i_ii£l£2D# 42 Utah 157, 129 P. 619 (1913); Beay£I_£oiiniy 
^_H2B£_Ind£mfliiy_£jQA, 88 Utah 1, 52 P.2d 435 (1935). This Court 
"must be convinced that there has been a failure to consider some 
material point in the case; that there has been error in the 
conclusions heretotore arrived at; or that some matter has been 
discovered unknown at the time of the hearing." Bisan.ijt 
Ei£ll3Id# 4 Utah 292, 11 P. 512f L£hLa 3£ni£3r 4 Utah 292, 9 P. 
573 (1886). Applying these standards, rehearing of this case 
should be denied. 
Detendant asserts that this Court's opinion is 
erroneously based on the presumption that no charges were brought 
against detendant until January, 1985, when in fact, charges had 
been filed against him on September 8, 1976. Thus, he claims the 
case should have been analyzed as a speedy trial issue, rather 
than a due process (pre-arrest or pre-indictment delay) issue. 
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As shown in the Statement of Facts portion of this 
answer, this Court was made amply aware during oral argument of 
defendant's assertion that a complaint had been filed against him 
on September 8, 1976. However, during tnat oral argument, 
defendant's counsel had to concede that that complaint was 
subsequently amended on September 13, 1976 naming Leonard Eugene 
Wright as the defendant, and that the amended complaint was 
subsequently dismissed on September 24, 1976. Counsel for 
defendant also had to concede that the record retlects that new 
cnarges were not filed against defendant until January, 1985. 
(Tape ot oral argument, dated March 13, 1986) A 
Accordingly, in footnote 1 of its opinion, this Court 
correctly assessed the facts when it observed that "another 
individual was charged shortly after the crime but those charges 
were dismissed at an early stage." Slip. op. at 1, n. 1. This 
Court did not misconstrue the material facts of this case. And 
under those facts, the Court correctly analyzed the issue as one 
of due process, and not speedy trial. Slip op. at 2-3. 
Counsel for the State at oral argument contended that 
the filing of the complaint against the defendant on September 8, 
1976 was not critical because his name was amended out five days 
later and the complaint was dismissed altogether sixteen days 
later. In such situations the issue is still treated as one of 
due process and not speedy trial. Counsel for the State cited 
1 Justice Zimmerman asked, "You don't contend then that any 
charges were pending against Richard Lynn Wright after 1976?" 
Counsel replied, "No," and reaffirmed that no charge or official 
information had been filed during that time. 
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yDii£d_££A±££_X*_tt££&fiDflld# 456 U.S. 1 (1982) for this 
proposition. There, cnarges were filed against Mr. MacDonald and 
were then retiled. Id. at 4-5. The United States Supreme Court 
rejected MacDonald's speedy trial claim finding the issue one of 
pre-arrest or pre-indictment delay under the due process clause 
citing IlDii£d_Siai££_^_M3liJ2nr 404 U.S. 307 (1971), and Ufliifid 
£ifli£S_YJL_i£Y.fl££2 # 431 U.S. 783 (1977). It expressly found that: 
[T]he speedy trial clause has no application 
after the Government, acting in good faith, 
formally drops charges. Any undue delay 
after charges are dismissed, like any delay 
before charges are filed, must be scrutinized 
under the Due Process Clause, not the Speedy 
Trial Clause. 
456 U.S. at 7 (cited in this Court's slip opinion at 3). 
Similarly, the Utah Supreme Court did not misapprehend 
the facts or the law in treating the issue under the Due Process 
Clause and retusing to analyze this case as denial of speedy 
trial. 
Finally, detendant's related claim on rehearing that 
this Court was confused over the speedy trial issue because 
earlier detense failed to cite to the record regarding the 
original complaint issued in 1976, should be summarily rejected 
for two reasons. £il£Jt# as noted above, defense counsel made 
this Court amply aware of the pertinent facts concerning that 
complaint during oral argument of this case. He furnished copies 
ot the complaint and cited to pages of the transcript of the 
lower court proceedings where the complaint had been discussed. 
Thus, counsel's earlier failure to cite to the record was not 
critical under the facts ot this case. Present defense counsel 
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is obviously not familiar with the efforts made by former defense 
counsel during the oral argument of this case. SfiCfiDd# as shown 
above, this Court obviously was not confused about the material 
tacts when it rendered its opinion using due process analysis. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT IS PRECLUDED FROM RAISING CLAIMS OF 
INEFFECTIVENESS OF COUNSEL FOR THE FIRST TIME 
ON REHEARING; MuREOVER SUCH CLAIMS LACK 
MERIT. 
In addition to the standards set forth in Point I for 
petitions for rehearing, courts have long recognized that it is 
wholly inappropriate to raise issues for the first time on 
renearing which could have been earlier presented. Sjgfi Q&LL^^JL 
EXIJLCA* 302 F.2d 688, 692 (1st Cir. 1962) (for litigant best 
familiar with matter directly in issue and claimed to be of 
paramount importance, to make no mention of subject until after 
case has been lost on another ground, and to present it in 
petition for rehearing is a breach ot duty to the court if 
deliberate, and inexcusable if inadvertent); £JiicJtj£ll_^ jL 
GlfifiDSysbr 100 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir. 1939) (appellant cannot 
contend for first time on rehearing that three-year statute of 
limitation was controlling; a party cannot shift his position on 
petition for rehearing); In&&2£n&£n±-WiL£lS£S-X£l&9L£Bh-.QQjL-Vji 
Efldifi-CfllB*# 270 U.S. 84, 86 (1926) (Supreme Court will not 
consider question as to rights of exclusive licensee of a patent 
under contracts, when raised for first time on rehearing); Uaiifid 
SlfllfiS.^-Wfl^jslj^jR^Cfi^, 322 U.S. 198 (1944) (facts which could 
have been brought to attention ot lower court, or raised earlier 
on appeal will not be considered on renearing). 
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Now that detendant has lost on the merits, he claims 
for the first time on rehearing that his former counsel was 
inetfective for failing to argue this case as a violation of due 
process (as opposed to a speedy trial claim) ,2
 anc3 for failing 
(unaer the due process analysis) to adequately introduce evidence 
of prejudice to his case resulting from the government's delay in 
retiimg the charges. Under the above cited authorities, 
appellant is precluded from raising this new claim on rehearing. 
Assuming the inetfectiveness ot counsel issues could be 
reached, the case law on pre-indictment or pre-arrest delay 
places the burden on the defendant to establish that (1) the 
delay was an intentional device by the prosecution to gain 
tactical advantage over the accused or to harass him, gnd (2) the 
delay caused substantial prejudice to defendant's case. 
Detendant must show both. United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 
(1971); Hflii£d_SiS*£S-2A_LAMSCflf 431 U.S. 783 (1977); and Sjtsifi 
v^_Baiigy, 812 P.2d 281 (Utah 1985) (all cited in our prior 
amended brief at 10-11). 
This Court correctly found that "td letendant has not 
alleged, fln3_ih£_J^£is_dfi_DS.t_£l}sg£5t, that the prosecution 
delayed the filing ot charges against him in order to achieve a 
tactical advantage." (Emphasis added.) Slip op. at 3. It was 
on this ground that appellant failed to establish a due process 
2 This claim is obviously wholly inconsistent with present 
counsel's tirst claim on rehearing that this Court should have 
analyzed this case as denial of a speedy trial issue. If this is 
so, then former counsel would not have been ineffective in 
failing to analyze the case under the due process clause. 
Present counsel, like former counsel, cannot have it both ways. 
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